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ABSTRACT
Art authentication boards are powerful; their determinations of authenticity can render artwork worthless or add
millions of dollars to market value. In the past, boards that
denied authenticity of artwork typically risked tort liability
for disparagement, defamation, or fraud. In Simon-Whelan v.
Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc., however,
an art collector alleged monopolization and market restraint
after an authentication board denied the authenticity of his
Andy Warhol painting by stamping “DENIED” on the back of
it. The case is the first antitrust lawsuit against an authentication board to survive the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
The decision therefore suggests potential liability exposure
under the Sherman Antitrust Act for art professionals who
render opinions on the authenticity of artwork. This Article
discusses how Simon-Whelan provides a framework for
pleading antitrust claims against authentication boards and
considers what standard could be appropriate for analyzing
similar claims at trial. This Article also describes how
antitrust law governing standards setting and product
certification outside the art world could apply to art authentication and organizations setting authenticity standards.
*
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INTRODUCTION
In 1962, Andy Warhol began mass-producing silkscreened prints
of Coke bottles, soup cans, and movie stars.1 Warhol produced this
art in his studio, known as The Factory, in much the same way
corporations mass-produced consumer goods.2 The line between
business and art soon blurred for Warhol: “Business art is the step
1

Robert Hughes, The Rise of Andy Warhol, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 18, 1982

at 6.
2

The Factory, WIKIPEDIA (Jan. 22, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/
index.php?title=The_Factory&oldid=409360588.

2011]

STANDARDIZING WARHOL

187

that comes after Art. I started as a commercial artist, and I want to
finish as a business artist.”3 Warhol reached his goal: In 2007, the art
collection of the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc.
approached $500 million.4 But with business-style success came
business-style litigation.
In 2007, art collector Joe Simon-Whelan filed the first antitrust
lawsuit against the Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board, Inc.
(“Board”), a non-profit organization that renders opinions about
whether Warhol paintings are authentic or not.5 Simon-Whelan had
submitted his $195,000 painting for authentication, but the Board
stamped “DENIED” on the back of the painting, rendering the work
of art worthless.6 Simon-Whelan documented the painting’s provenance and resubmitted it for authentication, but the Board again
stamped “DENIED” on his painting.
In response, Simon-Whelan sued the Board and the Andy Warhol
Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. (“Foundation”) in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.7 He
3

ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL (FROM A TO B AND
BACK AGAIN) 92 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1st ed. 1975).
4
Richard Dorment, What is an Andy Warhol?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 22,
2009, at 17, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/ 22/
what-is-an-andy-warhol/. The Foundation was formed in 1987 shortly after
Warhol’s death, pursuant to his will, and received hundreds of millions of dollars of
Warhol’s artwork from his estate in 1991.
5
Amended Class Action Complaint at 4-13, Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol
Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2007 WL 4825571; Defendants’ Memorandum of Law
in Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 14, Simon-Whelan v.
Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL
1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2008 WL 877019.
6
Id. Simon-Whelan’s Web site contains a detailed chronology of these events.
Joe Simon-Whelan, My Story, MY ANDY WARHOL, http://www.myandywarhol.eu/
my/my_story.asp (last updated Feb. 25, 2010). In 2006, the BBC also produced an
interesting documentary about the events leading up to the litigation. Imagine . . .
Andy Warhol: Denied (BBC television broadcast Jan. 24, 2006), available at Andy
Warhol Art Authentication, YOUTUBE (July 7, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mA1NBGtIlHE.
7
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y. May 26,
2009), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=467837269032
7755692&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholar.
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claimed the Foundation and the Board violated section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act”),8 which prohibits conspiracies in restraint of trade; and section 2, prohibiting monopolization.9
In particular, he alleged the Board restricted the market for authentic
Warhols to drive up the value of the Foundation’s own art collection.10 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.11 But the court denied this motion and allowed plaintiff’s
monopolization and market restraint claims to proceed based on the
Board’s rejection of the painting as an authentic Warhol.12 Although
the lawsuit was eventually dismissed with prejudice,13 the court’s
decision provides useful analysis of what elements need to be alleged
under the pleading standard articulated by the United States Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly14 to survive a motion to
dismiss and proceed to discovery.
This Article will explain how Simon-Whelan alleged sufficient
facts to survive the Board’s motion to dismiss, will describe the
analysis courts use to evaluate antitrust allegations, and will discuss
how antitrust cases involving certification and standards setting
outside the art world could contribute to an emerging antitrust theory
8

Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
10
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009), available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case= 4678372
690327755692&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholar.
11
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see also Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 14, Simon-Whelan v. Andy
Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL
1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2008 WL 877019.
12
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *8, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009).
13
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), complaint dismissed per
stipulation, No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS)(AJP) (Nov. 30, 2010); Press Release, The Andy
Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Warhol Foundation Case Dismissed By
U.S. Court (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.warholfoundation.org/foundation/ 32_
detail.html?page=1.
14
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
9
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and also suggest best practices to reduce exposure to liability.
I. ART MARKET AND AUTHENTICATION PRINCIPLES
Contemporary art is bought and sold on two basic markets: the
primary market for newly-created work of living artists; and the
secondary market for work that has already been sold on the primary
market.15 Secondary art market sales generally occur through
auctions and private-dealer sales where prices are often much higher
than in primary markets.16 The primary market involves curated
gallery exhibitions of work obtained directly from artists’ studios.
The supply side of both markets includes individual collectors,
private owners, museums, foundations, and dealers holding inventories, while the demand side includes collectors, museums, and
dealers seeking inventory. Intermediary dealers, galleries, and auction
houses bring these buyers and sellers together on the primary and
secondary art markets.
Authentication supports the secondary art market by stamping out
forgery and misrepresentation and providing a measure of certainty in
the secondary market.17 “[Stylistic] authentication is the process by
which art experts—academic or independent art historians, museum
or collection curators, art dealers, auction house experts—attribute a
work of visual art . . . to a particular artist.”18 Opinions about authenticity can change and various experts may have competing views on
the authenticity of a particular work of art.
Stylistic authentication methods vary, but often include: connoisseurship, in which the expert expresses observations in words;
15

New or Secondhand: The Ins and Outs of Primary and Secondary Markets,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.economist.com/node/14941173.
16
Auction prices of art sold on the secondary market can be tracked through
various online services. E.g., Most Frequently Asked Questions About the Fine Art
and Design Price Database, ARTNET, http://www.artnet.com/products/ pdb_faq.
asp?H=1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
17
Sam Sachs II, Introduction: Right or Wrong, Real or Fake: Who Cares?, 8
IFAR J. 6 (2006), http://www.ifar.org/publication_detail.php?docid=1210707503.
18
Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 23 (N.Y.
App. Div. Dec. 1, 2009) (citing Ronald D. Spencer, Introduction to THE EXPERT
VERSUS THE OBJECT: JUDGING FAKES AND FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS IN THE VISUAL
ARTS xi (Ronald D. Spencer ed., 2004)), appeal denied, 15 N.Y.3d 703 (2010).
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reviewing the catalogue raisonné, an annotated book of the artist’s
works; documenting provenance; and gathering eyewitness testimony.19 Authentication based solely on stylistic inquiry is inherently
subjective and therefore exposes the expert to potential liability.20
Another approach is scientific authentication in which the expert
conducts objective investigation based on tests including radiocarbon
dating, chemical analysis, or x-ray diffraction.21
Authentication of certain artwork, such as Warhol or Rembrandt,
can be particularly challenging when the artist was prolific and
employed assistants. Auction houses face considerable liability regarding the authenticity of artwork sold on secondary markets and will
often refuse to sell work excluded from an artist’s catalogue raisonné. In other words, authentication is as much a product of market
consensus as expert or scholarly inquiry.
If a work of art is not listed in a catalogue raisonné, secondary
market actors may, however, turn to authentication boards.22 Authentication boards are often created by artists’ foundations and comprised of individuals who have scholarly interest in an artist’s work or
first-hand experience working with the artist. Unlike a catalogue
raisonné, an authentication board only reviews artwork as it is
submitted by owners. In addition, the catalogue raisonné is often
attributed to a single author, while an authentication board is a
committee.
Some authentication boards have been short-lived, which can
make secondary market actors cautious about their opinions. For
19

Steven M. Levy, Authentication and Appraisal of Artwork, in ART LAW
HANDBOOK 829 (Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000); Samuel Butt, Authenticity Disputes in
the Art World: Why Courts Should Plead Incompetence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS
71, 73-74 (2004).
20
Steven M. Levy, Liability of the Art Expert for Professional Malpractice,
1991 WIS. L. REV. 595, 596 (1991).
21
LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ET AL., THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 22-41 (2d ed.
1993). Scientific and stylistic authentication methods are not mutually exclusive,
but rather can be used together to make even more reliable determinations.
22
Examples of authentication boards include: Roy Lichtenstein Authentication
Committee, Calder Foundation, The Moholy-Nagy Foundation, The Keith Haring
Foundation, and The Pollack-Krasner Authentication Board (disbanded). Jack
Cowart, A Listing of Some Deceased Visual Artists’ Foundations Filing 990 PFS
(Jan. 19, 2008) (on file with author), http://sharpeartfdn.qwestoffice.net/supple
ment/D-3_A-Listing-of-Some-Deceased-Visual-Artists.pdf.
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example, the Comite Picasso, a group of experts and members of
Pablo Picasso’s family, formed to make definitive assessments of
Picasso artwork, but broke up after Picasso’s daughter refused to
participate. The Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board, Inc. was
formed in 1995.23
II. HOW SIMON-WHELAN’S LAWSUIT SURVIVED THE BOARD’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Before Simon-Whelan, plaintiffs typically alleged tort theories
such as defamation, disparagement, or fraud against those who denied
the authenticity of submitted artwork.24 Only one of the six major artlaw treatises even mentions an antitrust cause of action.25 Until
Simon-Whelan, no plaintiff who had attempted an antitrust claim
against an authentication board had ever survived the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.26
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief,”27 the plaintiff in Simon-Whelan
had additional hurdles at the pleading stage under Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly:
23

Key members of the Board have included: Gary Garrels, Judith Goldman,
Christoph Heinrich, Jed Johnson, Sally King-Nero, Neil Printz, Robert Rosenblum,
and David Whitney.
24
See, e.g., McNally v. Yarnall, 764 F. Supp. 838, 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(defamation); Hahn v. Duveen, 234 N.Y.S. 185, 187 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (disparagement); Goldman v. Barnett, 793 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass 1992) (fraud). See generally
Ronald D. Spencer, The Risk of Legal Liability for Attributions of Visual Art, in
THE EXPERT VERSUS THE OBJECT: JUDGING FAKES AND FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS IN
THE VISUAL ARTS 144 (Ronald D. Spencer, ed., 2004).
25
RALPH E. LERNER, ET AL., ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLECTORS,
INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 624 (3d ed. 2005). At press time, art-law expert
Leonard D. DuBoff has said future editions of LEONARD D. DUBOFF, ET AL., THE
DESKBOOK OF ART LAW (2d. ed. 1993) and LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O.
KING, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL (4th ed. 2004) will contain discussions of the issues
raised in this Article.
26
See, e.g., Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL
654494 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994); Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 850 F. Supp.
250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
27
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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[S]tating such a claim requires a complaint with
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that
an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds
to infer an agreement does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for
enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”28
Antitrust litigation is tremendously complex and therefore factual
allegations in the complaint must be pled with sufficient specificity to
justify dragging the defendant through discovery.29 The Board moved
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on grounds it did not meet Twombly’s
pleading requirements. But Simon-Whelan found the complaint did
meet Twombly’s requirements by alleging (A) “sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face[]’” which (B) occurred within a “relevant market” and (C)
caused antitrust injury.30 As a result, discovery was allowed to
proceed. The litigation ultimately cost defendants nearly $7 million in
legal fees before the case was dismissed with prejudice.31
A. Plausibility
Plaintiff alleged Sherman Act section 1 (“Section 1”) violations
involving collusion between the Foundation that sold Warhol artwork
and the Board that authenticated Warhol artwork. Plaintiff also
28

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Id. at 558 (“a district court must retain the power to insist upon some
specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to
proceed. . . .[T]he costs of modern federal antitrust litigation and the increasing
caseload of the federal courts counsel against sending the parties into discovery
when there is no reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs can construct a claim from
the events related in the complaint.”)
30
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))).
31
Linda Sandler, Warhol Foundation's $7 Million Defense Beats Collector’s
‘Fakes’ Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 16, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2010-11-16/warhol-foundation-for-the-visual-arts-wins-lawsuit-with-7million-defense.html.
29
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alleged Sherman Act section 2 (“Section 2”) violations including
claims that the Foundation used the Board to remove competing
Warhol artwork from the market to drive up the value of the
Foundation’s art collection. The court found such allegations satisfied
Twombly because they “raise[d] a right to relief above the speculative
level.”32
The court concluded Simon-Whelan’s Section 1 claim met the
“plausibility” standard by alleging the Board (1) made unsolicited
suggestions that Warhol owners submit their work for authentication,
(2) reversed prior authentication determinations, (3) refused to
authenticate works the Foundation had attempted to purchase, and (4)
and was not independent of the Foundation.33 A recent decision from
the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Thome v.
Alexander & Louisa Calder Foundation, has discussed how these
allegations are now a possible framework for pleading antitrust
complaints against parties who deny authenticity.34
Simon-Whelan also found sufficient allegations of a Section 2
violation.35 Section 2 complaints must allege facts “indicative of
anticompetitive conduct with a specific intent to monopolize and a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power . . .”36 It is
notable that the court did not analyze the “specific intent to
monopolize” element. A Section 2 complaint should allege monopoly
power resulted from willful acquisition, not just accident or business
acumen.37 It is possible this element was adequately met by pleading
facts establishing plausibility, such as the Board’s alleged refusal to
authenticate works after attempting to purchase them. Nevertheless,
future authentication committee defendants should consider raising
the issue of specific intent to weaken complaints after Simon32

Id. at 555.
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009).
34
890 N.Y.S.2d 16, 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), appeal denied, 15 N.Y.3d 703
(2010).
35
Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
36
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009).
37
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
33
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Whelan.38 Moreover, given how much this case ultimately cost defendants, courts in the future may be more vigilant about scrutinizing
complaints before so readily allowing discovery to proceed.39
B. Relevant Market
After meeting Twombly’s plausibility standard, Simon-Whelan
also alleged the anticompetitive effects occurred within a “relevant
market.”40 Section 1 and 2 claims both require plaintiffs to define this
relevant market.41 The relevant market includes both a “geographic
market,” where the defendant competes, and a “product market” with
which the defendant’s product competes.42 (Both elements should be
established.)43 Antitrust plaintiffs argue the relevant market is narrow,
while defendants will downplay their market share by arguing their
products fit within a broader market.44 Although products like
artwork exist within a broad market, distinct submarkets can also
constitute distinct products.45
Two key decisions discussed in Simon-Whelan helped establish
there is a relevant submarket for Warhol artwork within the market
for modern and contemporary art. First, Simon-Whelan relied on
38

See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
Cf. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted) (“For complaints involving complex litigation—for example, antitrust or
RICO claims—a fuller set of factual allegations may be necessary to show that
relief is plausible.”); Kirihara v. Bendix Corp., 306 F.Supp. 72, 76 (1969) (“This
court believes that in potentially complex cases, particularly in cases involving
violations of the antitrust laws, the plaintiff should go beyond the ‘short’
requirements of Rule 8 if necessary to present a ‘plain’, i.e., understandable and
factual statement of the alleged antitrust violations.”)
40
See, e.g., Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-72; United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).
41
Adam J. Biegel, et al., Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, in
ANTITRUST ADVISER § 10.23, at 10-71 (Irving Scher ed., 4th ed. 2009).
42
1 Irving Scher, Horizontal Restraints and Monopolization, in ANTITRUST
ADVISER § 1.22, at 1-63 (Irving Scher ed., 4th ed. 2009).
43
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
44
Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
481-82 (1992) (finding a relevant market for a single brand of replacement parts)
with Elliot v. United Ctr., 126 F.3d 1003, 1005 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting allegation
of a relevant market for food sales within a single sports arena).
45
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
39
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dictum in Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery to find a relevant market for
famous works within the modern and contemporary art market.46 In
Vitale, the court had noted that “paintings by Jackson Pollock may
constitute a submarket, the monopolization of which may be
unlawful . . .” under the Sherman Act because such paintings lacked a
practical substitute.47 Second, the court relied on Kramer v. PollockKrasner Foundation to find a narrowly defined submarket for famous
artwork can be a relevant market sufficient to state a claim.48
Although the court correctly stated “relevant market” contains
two elements—product market and geographic market—it may have
conflated the analysis. In particular, Simon-Whelan found the
“distinct submarket . . . of Andy Warhol works within the modern
and contemporary art market” was a sufficient “relevant geographic
product market.”49 Again, product market concerns whether defendant’s product can be substituted,50 while geographic market
concerns the region of “effective competition.”51 While future
antitrust plaintiffs can safely assert the existence of a “relevant
submarket” for famous paintings, they should still carefully evaluate
both elements of the relevant market. Indeed much of the contemporary art market is concentrated in New York City, but it is also an
international market. A clearly defined relevant market helps courts
identify the area of economic activity and whether defendant has
exercised sufficient market power in that relevant market to constitute
a violation.
Another problem with the court’s definition of the relevant
46

Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009) (citing Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, 1994 WL 654494, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994)).
47
Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, No. 93 Civ. (PKL) 6276, 1994 WL 654494,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994).
48
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009) (citing Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 254
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
49
Id. (emphasis added).
50
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
481-482 (1992).
51
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1966).
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market is that it seems to overlook the possibility that other
contemporary artwork could substitute for Warhol work in the
secondary market. While some collectors might prefer Warhol, this
does not necessarily create a submarket for Warhol artwork. By
analogy, consumers might prefer particular automobile manufacturers, but this does not necessarily create separate relevant markets
for Hondas and Toyotas. In sum, the court’s finding—that there is a
relevant submarket for Warhol work—seems to exclude artwork from
other contemporary artists that are potential economic substitutes for
Warhol artwork.
C. Antitrust Injury
After establishing plausibility and relevant market, SimonWhelan alleged an “antitrust injury.”52 He argued the Board action
caused an injury that “reflect[s] the anticompetitive effect either of
the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation.”53 Simon-Whelan alleged the Board’s practice of stamping
“DENIED” on his artwork prevented him from participating as a
seller in the market for authentic Warhol art.54 The court affirmed the
Board’s practice of stamping “DENIED” on artwork, deeming it “not
authentic,” was a sufficient antitrust injury: “the double-stamping of
‘Denied’ on his artwork in furtherance of the alleged antitrust
conspiracy has prevented him from competing as a seller in the
lucrative market for authentic Warhols . . .”55
One unresolved issue is what type of market restraint occurs when
an art authentication committee prevents a seller from marketing his
or her own artwork. The first possibility is that such practices are
nonprice vertical restraints in which the committee is analogous to a
52

Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009).
53
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
54
Amended Class Action Complaint at 4-13, Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol
Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177
(S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009), 2007 WL 4825571
55
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44242 (S.D.N.Y.
May 26, 2009)
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producer dictating terms of sale to dealers.56 A second possibility is
that authentication is a nonprice horizontal restraint in which various
dealers conspire to shut out a particular dealer—a practice that would
be per se illegal.57 A plaintiff’s ability to uncover unlawful horizontal
market restraints often requires discovery, which is why surviving a
motion to dismiss was significant in Simon-Whelan.58
III. TWO LITIGATION PATHS: PER SE ILLEGAL OR RULE OF REASON
ANALYSIS
Surviving a motion to dismiss is just the beginning. Next, a
successful antitrust plaintiff must either prove defendant’s actions
were so blatantly anticompetitive as to be “per se illegal” or the
negative anticompetitive effects of such actions outweighed any procompetitive market effect. Whether a practice is per se illegal or
analyzed under the more flexible—and defendant-friendly—“rule of
reason” is a matter of law.59 This section describes how courts might
determine whether the per se or rule of reason analysis applies to an
art authentication activity.
A. Categorizing Market Restraints
Some business practices are considered unreasonable by their
very nature and therefore per se unlawful under the Sherman Act.
Unlawful Section 1 activities include agreements to fix prices,
boycott competitors, or limit production and control markets. To
determine whether a practice is per se illegal, courts will: (1) distinguish between vertical and horizontal market restraints, (2) consider
the effect on both interbrand and intrabrand competition, and (3) may
analyze price and nonprice restraints differently. Antitrust cases often
56

See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977);
see infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
57
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961).
58
All discovery is stayed pending resolution of a motion to dismiss an antitrust
cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
59
Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 772 (8th Cir.
2004).
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turn on how courts categorize a particular business practice.60
First, courts determine whether a business practice is a vertical or
horizontal market restraint.61 A vertical restraint occurs when businesses at different levels of competition collude in the same market,
while a horizontal restraint is an agreement between businesses at the
same level of competition. For example, an agreement between a
producer and dealer not to supply to other dealers could be a vertical
restraint.62 Collusion between dealers to fix prices would be a horizontal restraint. Vertical restraints are often subject to rule of reason
analysis; horizontal restraints are more likely to be per se illegal.63
The distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints blurs in
a “dual distribution” system in which a producer also competes with
dealers that sell the producer’s products.64 For example, an artist or
an art collector might sell paintings directly to the public and also
through particular private dealers. In most cases, the rule of reason
applies to such dual distribution systems.65 But if there is evidence of
a horizontal conspiracy to limit sales to particular dealers—even if a
dealer arranged the conspiracy—that would be per se illegal.66 Dual
distribution could involve a vertical group boycott (per se illegal) or a
60

Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1210 (2008).
61
See A-Abart Elec. Supply, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 956 F.2d 1399, 140203 (7th Cir. 1992) (vertical restraints are analyzed under rule of reason unless they
involve price fixing).
62
See Yeager’s Fuel, Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 953 F. Supp. 617, 654
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (forcing contractors to install only electric heating was a vertical
restraint because the power company and developers were at different distribution
levels).
63
See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1998) (antitrust
law does not apply per se rule to vertical boycotts unless there is also horizontal
agreement or price fixing); Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854
F.2d 802, 805 (6th Cir. 1988).
64
Lemley, supra note 60, at 1235-41.
65
See AT&T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 2006)
(although vertical relationship had horizontal elements, per se analysis was
inappropriate for dual distributorship arrangements).
66
E.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding evidence that dominant toy dealer coordinated a horizontal conspiracy
among manufacturers to limit their sales to certain dealers); accord NYNEX Corp.,
525 U.S. at 133-37 (single dealer’s decision to buy from one producer was a
vertical agreement not subject to per se rule against horizontal group boycotts).
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unilateral refusal to deal (likely to be lawful under rule of reason
analysis).
Second, courts always consider the effects of a business practice
on both interbrand and intrabrand competition. Interbrand competition means competition between businesses with developed brands or
labels; intrabrand competition, in contrast, means horizontal competition between distributors of the same product.67 Some art
authentication services arguably reduce interbrand competition by
suppressing the market for products deemed “not authentic.” Another
possibility is that art dealers reduce interbrand competition between
various authentication services by refusing to acknowledge the
opinions of certain types of authentication experts. Antitrust law is
mostly concerned with protecting interbrand competition; practices
that restrain interbrand competition are more likely per se unlawful.68
Courts have upheld exclusive dealership plans when such
decisions had only slight effects on intrabrand competition and a high
level of interbrand competition already existed.69 This suggests that if
a producer took action to shut down all sales of artwork outside
authorized channels that could arguably be an unlawful restriction on
intrabrand competition of certain distribution channels.70
Third, courts sometimes distinguish between price restraints and
nonprice restraints such as prohibiting sales outside designated
geographic areas or limiting sales to particular classes of customers.71
67

Competition between Coca-Cola and Pepsi is an example of interbrand
competition. Competition between department stores and discount outlets selling
the same products is an example of intrabrand competition.
68
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 n. 19 (1977)
describes this principle: “[W]hen interbrand competition exists, as it does among
television manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a
different brand of the same product.”
69
E.g., Elecs. Commc’ns. Corp. v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 129
F.3d 240, 244-45 (2d Cir. 1997).
70
Cf. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1075-76 (2d Cir. 1980)
(territorial restrictions imposed by producer upon distributors were unreasonable
when restrictions eliminated intrabrand competition within each distributor’s
territory); Graphic Prods. Dist., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1577-78 (11th
Cir. 1983) (benefits to interbrand competition did not outweigh the significant
burden on intrabrand competition).
71
E.g., Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746, 750-51 (6th Cir.
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After Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., the rule
of reason applies to both price and nonprice vertical restraints.72
Nevertheless, courts might still view price restraints with more
caution and scrutinize vertical price restraints for related unlawful
horizontal price restraints.
B. Per Se Antitrust Violations
Standards setting and certification activities outside the art world
are usually subject to the defendant-friendly rule of reason analysis.73
Nevertheless, it is important to consider the potential for a per se
violation because the consequence can be disastrous for an antitrust
defendant: If plaintiff establishes a per se violation, defendant will be
barred from attempting to offer procompetitive justifications for why
the restraint was reasonable.74 The penalty for an antitrust violation is
treble damages and the cost of suit, including attorney’s fees.75
A per se Section 1 Sherman Act violation requires plaintiff to
prove: two or more entities engaged in a conspiracy, combination, or
contract;76 to effect a market restraint prohibited per se;77 that proximately caused of the plaintiff’s antitrust injury.78 In general, the per
se rule applies to boycotts and price fixing, but not to unilateral
decisions to only buy goods from one producer.79 For example,
Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission held it was per se illegal for competing clothing designers
and dealers to agree not to deal with stores that sold copied styles.80 If
1986) (prohibitions requiring dealers to provide after-sale services were non-price
restraints evaluated under rule of reason).
72
551 U.S. 877, 881 (2007).
73
Cf. 15 USC § 4302 (2006) (“a standards development organization while
engaged in a standards development activity, shall not be deemed illegal per se;
such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its reasonableness”).
74
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218
(1940).
75
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
76
E.g., Guzowski v. Hartman, 969 F.2d 211, 214 (6th Cir. 1992).
77
Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v. Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241, 245 (6th Cir.
1982).
78
Hodges v. WSM, Inc., 26 F.3d 36, 38 (6th Cir. 1994).
79
NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 135 (1998).
80
312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
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competing art dealers banded together to shut out disfavored dealers,
this could also be an unlawful horizontal restraint.
In addition, an art producer’s actions could be unlawful if other
dealers were involved in setting market restrictions, rather than just
merely acceding to them.81 It could even be per se unlawful for distributors to lobby a producer to impose price restraints.82 On the other
hand, the plaintiff would have to show other dealers were actively
setting the market restraints in concert with the producer—if dealers
merely go along with a producer’s restrictions, that would not be
enough.83
In summary, the following practices are likely per se illegal: a
vertical agreement between a producer and a dealer to fix prices;
horizontal agreements between dealers or producers to fix prices; and
practices that eliminate all interbrand competition for production or
sale of particular works of art. In contrast, a nonprice vertical
restraint—such as refusal to sell artwork from producers who have
not obtained authentication—is likely subject to a rule of reason
analysis.
C. Rule of Reason Analysis
If a court does not find a per se antitrust violation, it will conduct
a rule of reason analysis of the alleged market restraint.84 The
Chicago Board of Trade Case gave the analysis its classic formulation: “whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
81

See, e.g., Toscano v. Prof’l Golfers’ Ass’n, 258 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir.
2001) (rejecting claim of conspiracy, when local golf tournament sponsors did not
participate in negotiating terms of restraints).
82
See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734-36
(1988) (agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor to terminate a
competing price-cutting distributor could be a per se violation if the parties actually
agree on the price to be charged).
83
Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 617 F. Supp. 800, 808-09 (N.D. Ind. 1985),
aff’d, 797 F.2d 1430, 1439 (7th Cir. 1986).
84
FTC v. Indep. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986); See generally,
M. Howard Morse, Standard Setting and Antitrust: The Intersection Between IP
Rights and the Antitrust Laws, IP LITIGATOR, May-June 2003, at 17, available at
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/publications/ (select articles from 2003; then scroll
to June 1, 2003).
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perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.”85 Today, the basic rule of
reason test is whether “anticompetitive effects outweigh . . . procompetitive effects.”86 This ad hoc balancing approach generally
requires the plaintiff to prove an agreement to restrain trade exists87
and the agreement was anticompetitive.88
While courts differ on how to conduct the ad hoc rule of reason
analysis, all courts focus on some of the following factors: (1) the
severity of the restraint; (2) defendant’s market power; and (3)
defendant’s intent.89
First, courts weigh the severity of the market restraint. Restraints
with “pernicious effects” will be held unlawful.90 For example,
restraints involving price restrictions will likely be unlawful.91
Second, courts examine whether the defendant has significant market
power.92 Market power means dominant market share in a welldefined product and geographic market.93 A standard measure of
85

The Chicago Board of Trade Case, 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1988). In
particular, a prima facie case requires proving: (1) the defendant contracted,
combined, or conspired; (2) the combination or conspiracy produced adverse
anticompetitive effects; (3) within relevant product and geographical markets; and
(4) plaintiff was injured as a proximate result. Int’l Logistics Grp., Ltd. v. Chrysler
Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1989).
87
E.g., St. Martin v. KFC Corp., 935 F. Supp. 898, 905-06 (W.D. Ky. 1996).
88
E.g., Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991).
89
E.g., Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1393 (10th Cir. 1992)
(analyzing vertical relationship under rule of reason); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v.
Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming that
establishing market power is a necessary element of every rule of reason case);
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436, n.13 (1978) (noting
“the general rule [is] that a civil violation can be established by proof of either an
unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.”).
90
E.g., Schaeffer v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 976 F. Supp. 736, 740-41 (W.D.
Tenn. 1997).
91
See Clairol, Inc. v. Bos. Disc. Ctr. of Berkeley, Inc., 608 F.2d 1114, 1124
(6th Cir. 1979) (upholding vertical customer restraints when seller did not impose
any restrictions on resale prices).
92
E.g., Winter Hill Frozen Foods & Servs., Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 691 F.
Supp. 539, 546-48 (D. Mass. 1988).
93
E.g., James M. King & Ass’n., Inc. v. G.D. Van Wagenen Co., 717 F. Supp.
667, 675 (D. Minn. 1989).
86
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market power would be sales within the relevant market divided by
total sales.94 Nevertheless, the art market’s relatively inelastic nature
and barriers to entry may allow dealers with smaller market share to
dominate—consumers will not necessarily turn to substitutes if prices
increase. Third, courts frequently indicate that unlawful intent does
not violate the rule of reason in the absence of anticompetitive
effects.95 Intent may, however, be relevant in determining whether the
effect of a restraint is unreasonable.96 Even a denial of authentication
that rendered art unmarketable would not violate antitrust law unless
there is some anticompetitive rationale, such as evidence that the
committee who made the decision also sells artwork in the same
relevant market.97
Regardless of which factors a court considers, the key inquiry is
the reasonableness of the challenged standard or certification.98
“Reasonableness” in this context generally refers to the effect of the
standard on competition, not to substantive reasonableness of the
standard itself.99
Once plaintiff shows anticompetitive effects of a market restraint,
the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a procompetitive justification.100 Courts have accepted procompetitive justifications such as

94

There is no magic number, but courts have rejected challenges to geographic
restraints when producers only command 10% of the relevant market. E.g., Ryko
Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231-34 (8th Cir. 1987).
95
E.g., Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 282 N.J. Super.
140, 186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
96
Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982)
(association liable for restraint of trade by misinterpreting an standard for
association’s own purposes).
97
Cf. DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 57-58 (1st
Cir. 1999) (defendant not liable for denying certification of laboratory-grade water
because defendant represented laboratories, rather than competing producers).
98
See e.g., Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492
(1988); U.S. Trotting Ass’n. v. Chi. Downs Ass’n., 665 F.2d 781, 787 (7th Cir.
1981); see generally, ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO. 23, THE RULE
OF REASON 6-7 (1999).
99
13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶¶ 2232a, 2232b, at 414 (2d ed.
2005).
100
E.g., Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County, 440 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir.
2006).
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increased information for consumers,101 uniformity across geographic
regions,102 and improved product quality.103 Art authenstication has
the important procompetitive effect of suppressing forgeries and
helping consumers select genuine artwork. The defendant must show
this procompetitive effect cannot be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner.104
Courts will investigate proffered justifications to determine
whether they are genuine. Sometimes courts determine a purported
procompetitive justification is just a sham to cover for an underlying
anticompetitive practice. For example, courts found a warranty
regulation system was a façade for an anticompetitive vertical market
allocation.105 Courts have examined press releases and meeting
minutes for evidence of ulterior motives in imposing a geographic
restraint.106 If dealers were refusing to sell artwork in an effort to
drive up the value of their holdings—rather than to exclude forgeries—this would weigh against the dealers in an antitrust analysis.
Practices could also be unlawful if solely motivated by price
considerations, rather than assisting customers or increasing market
efficiencies.107
In summary, vertical nonprice restraints are likely to be upheld as
reasonable under the “rule of reason” if the restraint promotes
interbrand competition without overly restricting intrabrand competition.108 But vertical restraints may be struck down if they have a
pernicious effect on interbrand competition, which will more likely
101

E.g., Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 296
(5th Cir. 1988).
102
E.g., Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th
Cir. 1980) (the standard “helps promote nationwide competition and enables
manufacturers . . . to be reasonably sure they will not have to modify their
product . . . .”).
103
E.g., Mendelovitz v. Adolph Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 1982)
(manufacturer has legitimate interest in taste and quality of its product).
104
Wilk v. Am. Med. Assn., 719 F.2d 207, 227 (7th Cir. 1983); Kreuzer v.
Am. Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
105
Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068, 1076-81 (2d Cir. 1980).
106
Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1012-13 (3d Cir.
1994).
107
See Beach v. Viking Sewing Mach. Co., 784 F.2d 746, 751 (6th Cir. 1986).
108
See, e.g., Three Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395,
1399 (9th Cir. 1987).
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occur when there is a latent horizontal component to the restraint.109
Courts have also struck down vertical nonprice restrictions under the
rule of reason when a producer was not acting independent from
distributors in imposing a market restraint.110 Again, this might occur
when the restriction on a producer is imposed at the behest of another
dealer.111
IV. FUTURE FRAMEWORKS: APPLYING ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF
CERTIFICATION AND STANDARDS SETTING TO ART
AUTHENTICATION
Allegations of antitrust violations may be on the rise within the
art world so it is useful for authentication boards to consider the
application of antitrust law as it applies to certification and standardssetting organizations.112 This section will explain how certification
and standards setting can raise antitrust liability and will describe
how best practices adopted by certification and standards-setting
bodies could apply to art authentication boards.
An industry standard is “a document established by consensus
and approved by a recognized body that provides for common and

109

E.g., Carlson Mach. Tools, Inc. v. Am. Tool, Inc., 678 F.2d 1253, 1261-62
(5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting distributor’s assertion that territorial restraints curbed
intrabrand competition without allegations of harm to interbrand competition).
110
See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1569-70
(11th Cir. 1983) (violation found under rule of reason when dual distributorsupplier with 70% market share terminated a distributor for not complying with
market restrictions).
111
See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 934-36 (7th Cir. 2000).
112
In January 2010 art collector Susan Shaer also sued the Andy Warhol Art
Authentication Board for denying the authenticity of Warhol artwork. Shaer v.
Andy Warhol Foundation For The Visual Arts, Inc., No. 2010 Civ. 00373
(S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://dockets.justia.com/docket/courtnysdce/case_no-1:2010cv00373/case_id-357265/; see generally Eileen Kinsella,
Warhol Board Faces New Lawsuit, ZIMBIO.COM (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.
zimbio.com/Andy+Warhol+Art+Authentication+Board/articles/8wlxvvExOKA/
Warhol+Art+Authentication+Board+Faces+New. But see, Andy Warhol’s Red SelfPortrait: An Exchange, ARTNET, (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.artnet.com/ magazine
us/news/artnetnews/joe-simon-andy-warhol11-17-10.asp. (describing how the
lawsuit was abandoned in November 2010).
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repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities . . .”113
Examples include standards for wall sockets, organic produce, and
cellular phone frequencies. Some standards are government mandated, while others result from voluntary self-regulation.114 Groups
such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) have
promulgated thousands of industry standards to promote safety or
quality.115 Standards are also important for facilitating commerce and
providing valuable information to consumers.
Once an industry standard is set, third-party certification bodies
often assess whether products conform to the standard.116 For
example, the Good Housekeeping “Seal of Approval” certifies that a
product underwent testing to meet a quality standard.117 When an art
authentication board authenticates a painting, it is, for all purposes,
certifying that the artwork met an authenticity standard.
Standards and certification activities by their nature restrain trade
because they divert business from one competitor to another.118
113

What are standards?, EUR. TELECOMMS. STANDARDS INST., http://www.
etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/WhatIsAStandard.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2011);
Maureen A. Breitenber, The ABC’s of Standards-Related Activities in the United
States (Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Paper No. NISTIR 7614, Aug. 2009),
available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/NISTIR_7614.pdf. See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L.
REV. 87 (2007), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol48/iss1/4/;
114
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT AND
TRADE INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (1995), available at http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record_id=4921&page=R1.
115
AM. NAT. STANDARDS. INST., About ANSI Overview, http://www.ansi.org/
about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1 (last visited January 19, 2011).
116
Jonathan T. Howe, Leland J. Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit
Certification Organizations: Conflicts of Interest and a Practical Rule of Reason
Approach to Certification Programs as Industry-Wide Builders of Competition and
Efficiency, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1982-1983).
117
The History of the Good Housekeeping Seal, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING,
http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/product-testing/history/good-housekeepingseal-history (last visited Jan. 18, 2011).
118
FTC, Bureau of Consumer Protection, STANDARDS AND CERTIFICATION
(FINAL STAFF REPORT) at 275-76 (1983); Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and
Trade and Professional Associations Standards and Certification, 19 DAYTON L.
REV. 471 (1994). For an excellent overview see Andrew Updegrove, Laws, Cases
and Regulations, CONSORTIUMINFO.ORG (2007), http://www.consortiuminfo.org/
laws/.
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Antitrust violations occur when standards are promulgated in an
effort to exclude competitors from the market.119 Standards setting
and certification practices are generally subject to the same antitrust
analysis as any other business practice. Nonprofit entities are also
subject to antitrust liability just like for-profit businesses.120
Drawing on these principles, an art authentication board should
ensure its authentication service benefits the market: “The paramount
antitrust challenge for nonprofit product certification products is to
demonstrate aggressively that such programs strengthen the competitive market system on an industry-wide basis.”121
A. Does Per Se or Rule of Reason Apply to Standards Setting and
Authentication?
In general, the rule of reason analysis applies to standards setting:
such activities will be upheld as long as the standard is reasonably
necessary to achieve a procompetitive benefit.122 For example, a court
refused to apply the per se rule to the American Kennel Club’s establishment of mandatory dog “breed” standards because uniformity was
necessary for competition among owners and breeders.123
Although rule of reason generally applies, some practices—such
as group boycotts—would be blatantly anticompetitive and always
per se antitrust violations.124 If a group of art dealers or auction
houses coordinated to exclude a particular authentication service from
the market for authentication services, this could arguably constitute a
119

13 HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, ¶ 2231a, at 409.
See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 US 756, 768-69 (1999).
121
Howe, supra note 116, at 357.
122
See, e.g., Cont’l Airline, Inc. v United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir.
2002) (per se rule inapplicable to a standard imposed by trade association to limit
the size of carry-on baggage). But see United States v. Nat’l Ass’n. of Broadcasters,
536 F. Supp. 149, 160-62 (D.D.C. 1982) (television broadcasters trade association
standard prohibiting the advertisement of more than one product in a commercial
lasting less than 60 seconds held per se illegal).
123
Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d
per curiam, 210 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
124
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (competitively
motivated horizontal group boycotts). A group boycott, also known as a refusal to
deal, means “withholding or enlisting others to withhold patronage or services from
the target.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 541-43 (1978).
120
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per se violation. A per se violation could also occur if an authentication committee forced others to follow its recommendations.125
In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., the
Supreme Court found a per se illegal boycott when a powerful group
of producers manipulated an industry standard to arbitrarily deny
certification to a competitor’s product.126 This suggests an authentication practice could also be per se illegal if the standard constituted
a horizontal agreement among competitors not to deal with a
particular dealer.127
It is worth noting, however, that courts sometimes refuse to apply
the per se rule in cases involving unique markets on the ground that
courts lacks experience to condemn certain practices on their face.128
For example, Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers refused to
apply the per se rule to the practice of barring member appraisers
from charging fixed appraisal fees.129 Commentators have similarly
argued the art market is sufficiently complex such that courts should
not decide issues of authenticity on a per se basis.130
In summary, standards setting will generally be subject to rule of
reason analysis unless the standard is a mere sham to facilitate
exclusion. Moreover courts generally apply rule of reason analysis to
certification decisions about particular products.131 In part, this is
125

See Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 292
(5th Cir. 1998); Int’l Healthcare Mgmt. v. Haw. Coal. For Health, 332 F.3d 600,
606 (9th Cir. 2003) (no antitrust violation when professional association did not
force anyone to follow its advice).
126
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961). Although Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery and Printing
Co. has since held that boycotts should be analyzed under the rule of reason, a
restraint can be per se unlawful if plaintiff “present[s] a threshold case that the
challenged activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly anticompetitive effects.” 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985).
127
See e.g., Pretz v. Holstein Friesian Ass’n., 698 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (D.
Kan. 1988); Consol. Metal Prods., Inc. v. Am. Petroleum Instit., 846 F.2d 284, 292
(5th Cir. 1988).
128
See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24
(1979) (refusing to apply the per se rule to issuances of blanket licensing to music).
129
744 F.2d 598, 603-04 (7th Cir. 1984).
130
See e.g., Samuel Butt, Authenticity Disputes in the Art World: Why Courts
Should Plead Incompetence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71, 85 (2004).
131
E.g., Eliason Corp. v. Nat’l Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 129-30 (6th
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because courts do not want to condemn practices with which they
lack sufficient expertise.132
B. Status of the Essential Facilities Doctrine
When product certification is necessary for a business to compete
in a given market, denial of certification could be a per se
violation.133 This “essential facilities” doctrine is not really an
independent basis for antitrust liability, but rather a type of monopolization claim.134 The Supreme Court has not directly supported a
cause of action for denial of essential facilities.135 Nevertheless, the
concept still has applicability to standards and certification and lower
courts continue to speak in terms of “essential facilities.”136
Radiant Burners found a producer of gas burners properly alleged
an antitrust claim against an industry association who refused to
certify the company’s gas burners as safe, thereby making them
impossible to sell.137 Denial of the association’s “seal of approval”
raised antitrust concerns because the seal had such prestige in the
industry that it had become mandatory in some local codes. An art
authentication board’s opinion could raise similar issues if a work of
Cir. 1980); Moore v. Boating Indus. Ass’ns, 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987); Hatley v.
Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1977); Jessup v. Am. Kennel
Club, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
132
E.g., Vogel v. American Society of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir.
1984) (noting, “the novelty of the challenged practice (novel to the courts, that is) is
a reason against per se classification.”).
133
Brett M. Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential
Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2008).
134
Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
135
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398 (2004).
136
Gregory v. Fort Bridger Rendezvous Ass’n, 448 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th Cir.
2006); Daisy Mountain Fire Dist. v. Microsoft Corp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 475, 490 (D.
Md. 2008). Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 40 F.3d 247 (7th Cir.)
(1994) (holding American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology did not improperly
refuse certification that was unnecessary for medical practice and did not inhibit
competition), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996); accord George R. Whitten, Jr.,
Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 558 (1st Cir. 1974) (standards
setting did not restrain trade when few architects followed the standard).
137
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656
(1961).
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art becomes unsalable without an authentication opinion.138
Given the factual similarities between “seals of approval” and
opinions about authenticity, plaintiffs like Simon-Whelan might
consider the reasoning from Radiant Burners when challenging
authentication decisions. This issue could also perhaps arise if auction
houses and dealers refused to sell paintings without authentication
from a particular board.
C. Liability Theories Challenging the Substantive Standard Itself
In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., the Supreme
Court held that standards setting must be substantively and procedurally fair.139 Courts rarely analyze the substantive “reasonableness”
of the standard itself on grounds they lack expertise to analyze the
technical details. That said, if there is evidence that the standard is
patently arbitrary, a court might reject the substantive standard itself
as unreasonable.
According to an FTC advisory opinion, standards should be kept
current with new research and authentication based on rigid
“pass/fail” processes should be avoided.140 In cases challenging a
substantive standard, the burden of proof with respect to reasonableness lies on those who develop and enforce the standards.141 This
suggests there is a significant liability exposure for authentication
boards employing secretive methods or methods based on subjective
knowledge rather than a consistent industry standard. Radiant
Burners, for example, struck down a certification test for lack of
“objective standards” because the standards had a potential to be
arbitrary and capricious.142
138

See Brookins v. Int’l Motor Contest Ass’n., 219 F.3d 849, 853-54 (8th Cir.
2000); Kramer, 890 F. Supp. at 256.
139
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509
(1988) (holding legality of standards-setting conduct under antitrust law “depends
upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process
from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining competition.”).
140
FTC Advisory Opinion No. 457, 78 F.T.C. 1628, 1971 WL 128741 (Mar. 8,
1971).
141
Id.
142
Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. at 658.
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There must be a basis for determining whether a product complies
with the standard. A standards setting organization might even be
forced to alter its standard if there is no reasonable justification for
excluding new products from the standard.143 For example, Wilk v.
American Medical Association struck down American Medical
Association standards denying chiropractors access to health facilities
because plaintiffs provided detailed information about the medical
benefits of chiropractic treatments.144 Those seeking authentication
should also marshal all relevant extrinsic evidence showing their
artwork is authentic.
D. Liability Based on Procedural Defects in the Authentication
Process
As collectors, boards, and courts grapple with antitrust litigation
over art authenticity, laws governing certification and standards
setting could provide guidance for evaluating the procedural aspects
of art authentication practices.145 If there is evidence that standard
setting or authentication was improperly manipulated to gain a
competitive advantage, this could raise antitrust concerns.146
Radiant Burners held standards and certification should be
evaluated by looking at the intent of those setting them and whether
the defendants have anticompetitive incentives.147 Evidence that
authentication practices were applied arbitrarily in the past would
also help the plaintiff.148 Courts might examine the composition of a
143

Am. Soc’y of Sanitary Eng’g, 106 F.T.C. 324, 329 (1985), 1985 WL
668922.
144
719 F.2d 207, 213-217 (7th Cir. 1983).
145
There is precedent for examining certification, standards setting, and
authentication under the same lens. For example, the Indian Arts and Crafts Board
within the U.S. Department of the Interior assists with registering certification
marks to ensure Native American art is genuine. 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2006).
146
Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Hydrolevel Corp. v. Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. 635 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1980),
aff’d 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, 61 F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); Carleton v. Vermont Dairy Herd Improvement Ass’n., 782 F. Supp. 926,
934 (D. Vt. 1991).
147
Radiant Burners, 364 U.S. 656.
148
See Hatley v. Am. Quarter Horse Ass’n, 552 F.2d 646, 653-54 (5th Cir.
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Board to identify procedural irregularities or possible conflicts of
interest.149
In response to an FTC advisory opinion regarding antitrust
liability for certification, ANSI promulgated due process guidelines
to ensure decisions are based on objective judgments rather than
economic self-interest.150 These guidelines are consistent with emerging practices in the art world. For example, College Art Association
authentication guidelines prohibit certifying bodies from offering
self-interested opinions.151
The U.S. Department of Justice has also affirmed that certification bodies should award seals of approval on non-discriminatory
bases.152 In short, numerous standards and certification guidelines
make clear there is a duty to administer authentication fairly and
without hindering competition:
[T]he objective character of a seal, and a reputation
for reliability, give rise to an obligation to administer
the seal with the utmost fairness and to make it available to everyone who can meet the tests. This follows
from the fact that when a seal has such prestige it can
mean the difference between success and failure to a
1977) (rejecting a challenge to a decision not to register a horse as a quarter horse
because the standards “were not applied in a discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious
fashion”).
149
Cf. Pretz v. Holstein Friesian Ass’n, 698 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (D. Kan.
1988) (holding cattle-breeding association liable for denying certification of
plaintiff’s cattle for failing milk content test because cattle became worthless
without certification).
150
See, e.g., ANSI Essential Requirements: Due process requirements for
American National Standards, AM. NAT. STANDARDS INST. (Jan. 5, 2010, 8:10
AM), http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/default.aspx (follow “American National
Standards” hyperlink; then follow “Procedures, Guides, and Forms” hyperlink; then
follow “2010 ANSI Essential Requirements” hyperlink; then follow “2010 ANSI
Essential Requirements” hyperlink).
151
Compare FTC Advisory Opinion No. 457, 78 F.T.C. 1628, ¶ 16, 1971 WL
128741 (1971) with Standards and Guidelines: Authentications and Attributions,
COLLEGE ART ASS’N (Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.collegeart.org/guidelines/ authen
tications.
152
Joel E. Hoffman, Industry-Wide Codes, Advertising, Seals of Approval and
Standards: As Participated in by the Trade Association, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 595
(1968).
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business.153
Authentication committees should therefore consider less restrictive
alternatives to stamping “DENIED” on rejected artwork.154 Alternatives could include refusing to provide a letter of authentication or
publishing a denial decision in the artist’s catalogue raisonné.
In the 1970s, the International Foundation for Art Research
(IFAR) was formed as an independent art accreditation service after
New York Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz raised concerns
about the growing risk of forgeries flooding the art market.155
Although organizations like IFAR had fewer conflicts of interest,
there were still concerns about transparency because “[authentication
committees] possess[] the aura of impartiality and scholarship . . .
[but their] internal procedures are secret . . .”156 Some art professionals responded to these concerns by adopting codes of ethics or
best practices guidelines.
Most museums, for example, prohibit curators from consulting on
third-party works.157 The Art Dealers Association of America also
adopted an ethical code.158 The College Art Association of America
issued authentication guidelines that require “[a]rt-historical documentation, stylistic connoisseurship, and technical or scientific
153

Robert B. Hummel, Antitrust Problems of Industry Codes of Advertising,
Standardization, and Seals of Approval, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 607 (1968)
(emphasis added).
154
See supra note 104. On the other hand, such practices would likely be
upheld under a rule of reason analysis if there were a rational basis for taking those
steps. Given that Warhol art is, quite literally, a product of mass reproduction
through near-identical series, there is a potentially high risk of Warhol forgeries
entering the market. Nevertheless, connoisseurship or scientific authentication
could provide less restrictive alternatives of weeding out fakes.
155
Leonard D. DuBoff, Controlling the Artful Con: Authentication and
Regulation, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 973, 1020 (1976) (citing Arnason, Introducing the
International Foundation for Art Research, MUSEUM NEWS, Apr. 1972, at 28). See
generally, INT’L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH, http://www.ifar.org/authentication
.php (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).
156
DuBoff, supra note 155, at 1019-20.
157
ELAINE A. KING & GAIL LEVIN, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 257 (2006).
158
See generally, Professional Guidelines, INT’L. FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH,
http://www.ifar.org/professional_guidelines.php (last visited Jan. 18, 2011);
LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW IN A NUTSHELL 85 (3d ed.
2000).
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analysis . . .”159 Despite such efforts, many authentication boards
continue to conduct their work in secret.160 This strategy could be
harmful in defending against antitrust lawsuits because clear procedural safeguards in the standards development and authentication
process can tip the rule of reason analysis in the defendant’s favor.161
In summary, antitrust issues arising from non-art certification and
standards setting could offer additional legal theories for litigants
challenging art authentication decisions by suggesting procedural
protections the authentication boards should provide. At the same
time, adopting formal procedures for authentication shields authentication boards that consistently follow the procedures. Committees
should not attempt to enforce their standards by punishing market
actors that deviate.162 Instead, the authentication process should
include clear criteria, appeal processes, and a mechanism for
amending existing standards.
CONCLUSION
Simon-Whelan potentially increases the liability of art professionals who pass judgment on the authenticity of artwork.163 Tort
litigation has already shuttered many authentication bodies in the
past.164 After Simon-Whelan, antitrust liability has the potential to
159

Standards and Guidelines: Authentications and Attributions, COLLEGE ART
ASS’N (Oct. 25, 2009), http://www.collegeart.org/guidelines/authentications.
160
Kai B. Singer, ‘Sotheby's Sold Me a Fake!’—Holding Auction Houses
Accountable for Authenticating and Attributing Works of Fine Art, 23 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 439, 449 (1999-2000); See Steven M. Levy, Liability of the Art Expert for
Professional Malpractice, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 595, 596 (1991)
161
Committees that insist on secret authentication practices should consider
carrying an Errors and Omissions insurance policy. CRSA Guidelines for Issuing
Scholarly Opinions about Authenticity, CATALOGUE RAISONNÉ SCHOLARS ASS’N
(Apr. 2010), http://www.catalogueraisonne.org/CRSAGuidelines.pdf.
162
See, e.g., Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d
123, 132-33 (3d Cir. 2005) (no antitrust violation when trade association criticized
plaintiff’s products, but did not coerce market actors).
163
Sharon Flescher & Mary Morabito Rosewater, Dispute Against the Warhol
Authentication Board Allowed to Proceed, 11 IFAR J. 36 (2009), http://www.
ifar.org/publication_detail.php?docid=1251923912.
164
The Pollock-Krasner Authentication Board, for example, shut down after
fighting numerous legal battles with disappointed collectors. McCloud v. Lawrence
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make this line of work even more risky. As this new legal theory
emerges, the law of antitrust governing certification and standards
setting could both strengthen causes of action against art authentication bodies and suggest best practices to reduce liability.
Authentication bodies should therefore respond by carefully evaluating the current practices and protections offered by certification and
standards setting outside the art world.
PRACTICE POINTERS


A denial of authenticity that prohibits a collector from selling his
or her painting can constitute a sufficient antitrust injury under
the Sherman Antitrust Act, but factual allegations in a complaint
must be sufficiently specific to justify dragging a defendant
through discovery. Plaintiffs should review the factors outlined in
Simon-Whelan and Thome to ensure pleadings contain a plausible
claim for antitrust relief under Twombly.



Famous paintings, such as works by Jackson Pollock or Andy
Warhol, might constitute a relevant submarket for purposes of
antitrust pleading. But the exact contours of a submarket for
Warhol artwork remains unclear and may overlook the possibility
that other contemporary artwork could be economic substitutes
for Warhols.



Antitrust law has a rich body of precedent dealing with standards
setting and certification that could also apply to art authentication.
Those laws suggest there is a duty to administer authentication
fairly and without hindering competition.



Art authentication is likely subject to “rule of reason” antitrust
analysis and therefore lawful unless the anticompetitive effects of
the authentication process outweigh the procompetitive benefits.
While courts usually will not analyze the substantive reasonableness of a standard itself, a court might reject a substantive
standard if there is evidence it is patently arbitrary.

Gallery, Ltd., No. 90 Civ. 30(KMW), 1991 WL 136027 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1991);
Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Lariviere v.
Thaw, 2000 NY Slip Op. 50000(U), 2000 WL 33965732 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 26,
2000).
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Organizations authenticating artwork should avoid conflicts of
interest—or perceived conflicts of interest—by ensuring no one
involved in authentication sells potentially competing artwork.
Procedural due process protections should be transparent and
organizations should conduct periodic reviews to ensure internal
compliance.

